University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

1-15-1965

In re Waltreus
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, In re Waltreus 62 Cal.2d 218 (1965).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/532

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

[Crim. No. 7932.

In Bank.

Jan. 15, 1965.]

In re EUGENE R. WALTREUS on Habeas Corpus.
[la, Ib] Habeas Corpus-Petition-Sufficiency.-In a petition for
habeas corpus, allegations concerning the asserted perjury of
a prosecution witness did not warrant appointment of a referee
where the matters relied on were either brought out at the trial
or were then known by petitioner and could have been shown.
[2] Id.-Petition-Contents.-An application for habeas corpus
on the ground of perjured testimony must set forth facts
that prove perjury and knowledge thereof by the prosecution
and must show that those facts existed independently of the
contradictions appearing at trial; it must also appear that
petitioner had no opportunity to present the alleged true
matter at trial.
[3] Id.-Petition-Sumciency.-In a petition for habeas corpus
claiming the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony,
allegations pointing out the contradictory testimony at the
trial by a prosecution witness, his purported employer, and a
bail bondsman concerning the identity of the employer of the
witness and payments to the bail bondsman did not suffice to
support the claimed use of perjured testimony.
[4] Id.-Petition-Sufficiency.-In a habeas corpus proceeding
based on the prosecution's alleged knowing use of perjured
testimony, it was clear that petitioner had the opportunity
[1) SeeCal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 77; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus (1st ed § 122 et seq).
licK.
Corpus,
§ 1019;
Habeas

Dig. References: [1,3-5) Habeas Corpus, § 51; [2) Habeas
§ 52; [6-8] Criminal Law, §§ 104.5, 271; [9] Criminal Law,
[10] Criminal Law, § 107; [11] Explosions, §l7; [12]
Corpus, § 12.
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to present the alleged true matter at the trial where there were
allegations in the petition that a prosecution witness admitted
he made a mistake in testifying that while listening on an extension telephone he heard a number being dialed and a CODversation between a codefendant and petitioner when pctitioner
asked him if he was aware a telephone conversation could
not be made if he had lifted the extension receiver.
ld.-Petition-Sufficiency.-A petitioner for habeas corpus,
claiming the prosecution's use of perjured testimony, relied
solely on matters known to him at the trial where his petition
contained allegations that an objection was sustained to his
impeaching evidence for failure to lay a proper foundation
and that he appeared for himself and did not know how to
lay the necessary foundation.
Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery and
Inspection: Compelling Production of Documents.-A defendant can compel the People to produce statements of proseeution witnesses relating to matters covered in their testimony.
ld.-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery and Inspection:
Compelling Production of Documents.-Where defendant seeks
to examine statements of prosecution witnesses, but the documents contain matters unrelated to the defendant's case whose
disclosure would interfere with effective law enforcement, the
trial court should excise the unrelated parts, which should be
preserved to permit reexamination by the appellate court of
the entire text to determine the correctness of the trial court's
ruling.
ld.-Rights of Accused-Rights of Discovery and Inspection:
Compelling Production of Documents.-Though deletion, by the
trial judge, of parts unrelated to defendant's case from docu- .
ments relating to matters covered by testimony of prosecution
witnesses before disclosure of the documents to defendant does
not permit defense counsel to determine the relevance and
importance of the deleted parts, such procedure affords a
reasonable compromise between defendant's right of use and
the prosecution's need to withhold irrelevant confidential information and is consistent with the rule that public records
are subject to inspection, except when expressly made privileged. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1892,1881, subd. 5.)
ld.-Judgment-Collateral Attack.-Tbougb portions of a docun:.ent rMating to matters covered by the testimony of prosecution witnesses were withheld from defendant, and though
the document was not reex&mined on appeal from the judgment
of conviction, it cannot be assumed on collateral attack that

[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 382; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed § 917
et seq).
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the trial court acted improperly in withholding portionR of the
document determined by the trial court to have nothing to do
with his eaRe.
[10] Id.-Rigbts of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Qn being advispd
of the right to representation by the public defender, who appeared for a codefendant, it was incumbent on defendant to
raise in the trial court the matter of his desire to have other
counsel Misigned because of alleged conflict of interest.
[11] Explosions-Criminal Liability-Constitutionality of Statutes.
-The ab~H'nce of a definition of "explosive" in Health. & Saf.
Code, § }2354, making it a felony to maliciously use any explosive in a building, did not make the section so vague as to
be unconstitutional where, at the time of defendant's violation
of § 123M, the term "explosives" as used in the chapter containing tlll1t section was defined by § 12350.
[12] Habeas Corpus-Writ as Substitute for Appea.l.-Ordinarily,
habeas corpus cannot serve as a second appeal.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from
custody. Lewis Drucker, Judge. Order to show cause discharged and writ denied.
Morris IAlvine for Petitioner.
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, William E. James,
Assistant Attorney General, Norman H. Sokolow, Deputy
Attorney General, William B. McKesson, District Attorney
(Los Angel{'S) and Samuel Mayerson, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Petitioner was convicted of assault with
a deadly welll)(>ll, using and placing an explosive in or near
buildings wit.h intent to destroy them, and conspiracy to commit such act.~ and to obtain property by means of threat', of
mjury to tIll' owner and his property.l The judgment was
affirmed (People v. Darnold (1963) 219 Cal.App.2d 561 [33
Cal.Rptr. 36!) J ), petitions for rehearing and for hearing by
this court '\\'(,1'e denied, and the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari (Waltreus v. California, 376 U.S. 959
[84 S.Ct. V8], 11 L.Ed.2d 977]). Petitioner now seeks a
IPetitioner Wl\8 jointly indicted for the offenses with five other defend·
ants, Brajevit"ll. Mi8so, Le Fave, Darnold, and Lenahan. After the jury
was sworn and l)('fore testimony was taken the charges against Brajevich
WE're dismissrd IIpon the prosecution '8 request. The charges against.
1Ilisso WE're 8uh.,·qucntly dismissed. Le Fave was found not guilty, and
the remaining ,1(·fcnduuts were found guilty.

)
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writ of habeas corpus on the ground, among others, that his
conviction was obtained by perjured testimony knowingly used
by the prosecution.
It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the evidence reported
in about 3,500 pages of transcript. In brief, there was evidence that petitioner induced others to commit an assault upon
J osepb Peskin and to place dynamite in his business establishments, that petitioner sought by such means to compel
Peskin to return a business to Le Fave, and that petitioner
conspired with others to commit the offenses and to obtain
property from Peskin by means of threats to his person.
[la] One of the principal prosecution witnesses, Brajevich,
testified that at various meetings held at petitioner's office al:d
elsewhere plans were made relating to the assault and the use
of dynamite. Petitioner contends that Brajevich's testimony
that he "had been at the office of the petitioner when the alleged arrangements were made" was perjured and was known
by the prosecution to be perjured. He alleges that other wHnesses testified that petitioner had vacated the office before
the dates of the asserted meetings. He also alleges that Brajevich testified that the meetings took place in one of two small
offices at the rear of the main office, that no such small offices
exist, and that this fact was known or should have been known
by the officers investigating the case.
[2] An application for habeas corpus on the ground of
perjured testimony must not only set forth the facts that
prove perjury and knowledge thereof by the prosecution, but
must also show that those facts existed independently of the
contradictions appearing at the trial. (In re Manchester
(1949) 33 Ca1.2d 740, 742 [204 P.2d 881].) It must also
appear that the petitioner had no opportunity to present the
alleged true matter at the trial; that is, that there was such
suppression of the· truth by the authorities that he was precluded from discovering it and using it at the trial. (In re
Manchester, supra, at p. 742; Green v. United States (1st Cir.
1958) 256 F.2d 483, 484; see In re Imbler (1963) 60 Ca1.2d
554, 565 [35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6].)
[lb] The' allegations regarding the asserted perjury by
Brajevich do not warrant the appointment of a referee, for
the matters relied on were either brought out at the trial or
were known by petitioner at the time of trial and could have
been shown.
[3] In claiming that the prosecution knowingly presented
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perjured testimony, petitioner points to testimony by Brajevich concerning the identity of his employer and payments
to a bail bondsman and to contradictory testimony by the purported employer and the bail bondsman. Such contradictions
are insufficient to support petitioner's claim. (In re Manchester, supra. 33 Ca1.2d 740, 742.)
[4] A second claim of perjury involved the testimony of
a witness namea McLin that, while listening on an extension
telephone, he heard a number being dialed and then a conversation between Le Fave and a man who responded to petitioner's name. Petitioner alleges that a number cannot be
dialed while an extension receiver is off the hook, that the
prosecution therefore must have known McLin's testimony
was perjured and that, when he asked McLin whether he was
aware a telephone conversation could not be made if he had
lifted the extension receiver, McLin admitted "he had made
a mistake." It is clear from petitioner's allegations that he
had an opportunity to present the alleged true matter at the
trial.
.
[5] A third charge of perjury was based on the testimony
of a witness named Bulat. The petition alleges: Bulat testified
at the grand jury hearing that he had witnessed several meetings of the defendants in petitioner's office. Before the trial
he told petitioner and two attorneys that his testimony was
false and that he had given the testimony because state officers
had threatened to prosecute him for several burglaries unless
he "testified as the officers stated that he should." On information and belief petitioner alleges that Bulat made an offer
to the district attorney to correct his testimony and was told
he should stand by his original story.2 At the trial Bulat, who
was called as a prosecution witness, testified that he had
"heard certain conversations" between petitioner and other
defendants at petitioner's office. Petitioner attempted to introduce evidence of the foregoing alleged facts to impeach
Bulat's testimony, but an objection on the ground that a
proper foundation had not been laid was sustained, and petitioner, who appeared in propria persona, did not know how
2The Attorney General points out that at the trial Bulat gave testimony
inconsistent with some of the foregoj.ng allegations. Bulat testified that
officers had not threatened him or told him what to testify to before
the grand jury or at trial and that when he told the prosecutor that he
was unsure of some statements that he had.made to the grand jury, the
prosecutor told him that when he testified he was "just to tell" what
he could remember and what he knew was the truth.
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to lay the necessary foundation. It is thus clear that petitioner
now relies solely on matters known to him at the time of trial.
The petition next alleges that the prosecution suppressed
evidence favorable to the defense, namely, out-of-court statements by Brajevich that were inconsistent with his testimony
at trial. According to the petition, an attorney informed petitioner before trial that a member of the district attorney's
staff told him that Brajevich had lied to the grand jury in
order to secure an indictment and had made tape recorded
statements to the police contrary to his testimony before the
grand jury, and that if petitioner could obtain the statements
or the tapes "it would probably win his case." Petitioner
sought to subpoena the statements, but the officials denied that
such statements existed, and his motion for pretrial discovery
of the statements was dismissed. At trial, however, an officer
admitted in response to petitioner's questions that he had "the
documents" containing Brajevich's statements. A document
of over 100 pages was then brought into court, but petitioner
was allowed to see only one and one-half pages. As the opinion
on appeal shows, the trial court was satisfied that it did not
relate to the charges in the indictment. In denying a motion
for a new trial the court stated that the report contained
information furnished by Brajevich "relating to offenses in
other counties as well as in this county, which had nothing
at all to do with the case." On appeal it was concluded that
the court did not err in refusing to permit. inspection of the
rest of the document. (People v. Darnold, supra, 219 Cal
App.2d 561,579-582.)
[6] A defendant can compel the People to produce statements of prosecution witnesses relating to the matters covered
in their testimony. (Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal2d 423,
424 [340 P.2d 593]; People v. Chapman, 52 Ca1.2d 95, 98
[338 P.2d 428] ;PeopZe v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 586 [301 P.2d
1], cert. den. 353 U.S. 930 [77 S.Ct. 721, 1 L.Ed.2d 724].)
[7] When, however, the documents contain matters unrelated
to the defendant's case whose disclosure would interfere with
effective law enforcement (see People v. Lopez,60 Ca1.2d 223,
246 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16]), the trial court should
inspect the documents and excise the unrelated parts. These
parts should be weserved so that the appellate court can reexamine the entire text to determine the correctness of the
trial judge's ruling if the defenda~t appeals. [8] Although
this procedure does not permit defense counsel to determine
for himself the relevance and importance of the withheld ma-
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terial, it affords a reasonable compromise between the de-'I'
fendant's right to use the statement and the prosecution'8'
need to withhold confidential information not relating to the)
case. It is consistent with the rule that public records are 1
subject to inspection except when expressly made privileged. 1
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1892,1881, subd. 5.) It is the compromise !
Congress adopted in the Jencks Act (18 U.RC.A., § 3500), i
which we believe is an appropriate model for this court to :
follow in adopting its own rule. (See Decorative Carpets, Inc. \
v. State Board of Equalization, 58 Ca1.2d 252, 256 [23 Cal. 1
Rptr. 589, 373 P.2d 637].) [9] Although the document i
was not examined by the appellate court on the appeal in this
case, we cannot assume on collateral attack that the trial court
acted improperly in refusing to allow petitioner to see the
parts of the document that the court concluded "had nothing
at all to do with the case. "
Petitioner raises again a contention rejected on appeal,
that it was error not to appoint counsel to represent him in the
trial court. (People V. Darnold, supra, 219 Cal.App.2d 561,
579.) According to the opinion on appeal, petitioner told the
court before trial that he was representing himself, that he had
been advised that if he did not have sufficient funds to employ
counsel he had a right to the public defender's services, and
that he would reserve his decision as to whether he would be
represented by the public defender but felt confident that he
would represent himself. He informed the court immediately
before the selection of the jury that he was representing himself, and he did not request that counsel be appointed. Before
denying petitioner's motion for a new trial the court stated
that the manner in which petitioner had conducted himself
throughout the trial showed that he was •• a rather brilliant
man, in the way he handled his case." [10] Petitioner
contends in effect that the public defender could not have
represented him throughout the trial court proceedings because
the public defender represented Brajevich during part of the
proceedings and there was a conflict of interest between that
defendant and petitioner. It would seem, however, that having
been advised that he had a right to be represented by the public
defender it was incumbent upon petitioner, had he wished to
have other counsel assigned, to raise the matter in the trial
court, aml there is no claim that he did so.
[11] There is no merit in the contention that Health and
Safety Code section 12354 ~s so vague as to be unconstitutional
because it does not contain a definition of the word "ex-
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plosive. "3 Section 12354 provides: "Every person is guilty
of a felony ... who, ... maliciously uses ... any explosive at
... any (a) building ... " and section 12350, as it read at the
time of the offenses charged, provided: "'Explosives,' as
uscd in this chapter [which includes section 12354] means
nitro-glycerine, dynamite, vigorite, hercules powder, giant
powder, or any other high explosive."
It is further contended that the evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict, that the court erroneously refused to
require the prosecutor to testify concerning his good faith
in asking certain questions on cross-examination, that the court
improperly failed to give certain instructions, and that the
verdict of acquittal as to Le Fave was inconsistent with the
verdict of guilt as to the remaining defendants. [12] These
arguments were rejected on appeal, and habeas corpus ordinarily cannot serve as a second appeal. (In re Winchester
(1960) 53 Cal.2d 528, 532 [2 Cal.Rptr. 296, 348 P.2d 904].)
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition
denied.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke, J.,
and Schauer,J.· concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied February 24, 1965. Mosk, J., did not participate therein.

30n appeal the District Court of Appeal rejected a related argument
to the effect that section 12354, "as applied in this ease, where no
d.cfinition of an 'explosive' was given in an instruction, is uncon&titu·
honal. " The court stated that the indictment charged that the explosive
used was dynamite, that the word "explosive" was commonplace, and
that it was not necessary to define it in an instruction. (People v.
Darnold, supra, 2]9 CaJ.App.2d 561, 583.)
-Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign·
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
G2 C.:ad_

